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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of enhancing user
privacy in common machine learning development
tasks, such as data annotation and inspection, by
substituting the real data with samples form a gen-
erative adversarial network. We propose employ-
ing Bayesian differential privacy as the means to
achieve a rigorous theoretical guarantee while pro-
viding a better privacy-utility trade-off. We demon-
strate experimentally that our approach produces
higher-fidelity samples, compared to prior work, al-
lowing to (1) detect more subtle data errors and bi-
ases, and (2) reduce the need for real data labelling
by achieving high accuracy when training directly
on artificial samples.
1 Introduction
With machine learning (ML) becoming ubiquitous in many
aspects of our society, questions of its privacy and security
take centre stage. A growing field of research in privacy at-
tacks on ML [Fredrikson et al., 2015; Shokri et al., 2017;
Hitaj et al., 2017; Truex et al., 2018] tells us that it is possible
to infer information about training data even in a black-box
setting, without access to model parameters. A wider popu-
lation, however, is concerned with privacy practices used in
the ML development cycle, such as company employees or
contractors manually inspecting and annotating user data1,2.
The problem of privacy attacks is often tackled with
adding a differentially private mechanism to the model train-
ing procedure [Abadi et al., 2016]. Differential privacy
(DP) [Dwork, 2006] provides a rigorous theoretical guaran-
tee, which states (informally) that the algorithm output would
not significantly change when a single user adds or removes
their data, except with small (failure) probability. Another ap-
proach gaining popularity is federated learning (FL) [McMa-
han et al., 2016; Bonawitz et al., 2017], where a central en-
tity trains a model by computing updates locally on-device
1https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/10/
skype-audio-graded-by-workers-in-china-with-no-security-measures
2https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/
is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio
and then securely aggregating these updates on a server. This
way user data never leave their devices.
In spite of significant progress, neither of these approaches
solves the problem of manual data labelling. Moreover, it
creates an additional hurdle for developers, as they cannot
inspect data, especially in decentralised settings, making it
difficult to understand the model behaviour and find bugs in
data and implementations. Augenstein et al. [2019] provide a
more complete characterisation of these questions.
This paper follows Augenstein et al. [2019] in adopting
generative adversarial networks (GAN) [Goodfellow et al.,
2014] trained in a privacy-preserving manner for addressing
these issues. More specifically, we use the notion of Bayesian
differential privacy (BDP) [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a],
which takes into account the data distribution and provides
a more meaningful guarantee for in-distribution samples than
classical DP. Intuitively, when DP has uniform failure prob-
ability for all data points, BDP allows it to be non-uniform,
thereby discounting points that are naturally difficult to hide
and providing a strong guarantee for the rest of the dataset.
Since both can use the same obfuscation mechanism, while
computing two privacy bounds in parallel, a DP guarantee
would still hold for out-of-distribution samples. More details
on the overall approach and privacy are provided in Section 4.
The advantage of using this privacy definition is that it en-
ables generating data of higher fidelity, compared to previous
work on GANs with DP, allowing for finer-grained inspection
of data. While some problems with data or data pipelines can
be discovered using very coarse samples (e.g. pixel intensity
inversion in [Augenstein et al., 2019]), more subtle bugs, like
partial data corruption, would require samples of much better
quality, rendering the DP guarantee too loose to be meaning-
ful. Moreover, if fidelity is high enough, synthetic data can
be used for annotation and training itself, removing the re-
lated privacy concerns and extending applicability of FL. We
evaluate our solution in these two aspects in Section 5.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• we use Bayesian DP to enable higher quality GAN sam-
ples, while still providing a strong privacy guarantee;
• we demonstrate that this technique can be used to dis-
cover finer data errors than has been previously reported;
• we also show that for some tasks synthetic data are of
high enough quality to be used for labelling and training.
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2 Related Work
A rapidly expanding area of privacy-preserving machine
learning research has been recently focused on the attacks
that compromise privacy of training data, such as model
inversion [Fredrikson et al., 2015] and membership infer-
ence [Shokri et al., 2017]. The former is based on observing
the output probabilities of the target model for a given class
and performing gradient descent on an input reconstruction.
The latter assumes an attacker with access to similar data,
which is used to train ”shadow” models, mimicking the tar-
get, and the attack model, which predicts if a certain exam-
ple has already been seen during training based on its output
probabilities. Both attacks can be performed in a black-box
setting, without access to the model internal parameters.
Differential privacy (DP) [Dwork, 2006] is widely ac-
cepted as the gold standard for preventing such attacks. One
of the early takes on the problem is to use disjoint datasets
and distributed training with DP. For example, [Shokri and
Shmatikov, 2015] propose to train a model in a distributed
manner by communicating sanitised updates from partici-
pants to a central authority. Such a method, however, yields
high privacy losses [Abadi et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016].
An alternative technique suggested by [Papernot et al., 2016]
also uses disjoint training sets and builds an ensemble of in-
dependently trained teacher models to transfer knowledge to
a student model by labelling public data. This result has been
extended in [Papernot et al., 2018] to achieve state-of-the-art
image classification results in a private setting (with single-
digit DP bounds). A different approach is taken by [Abadi et
al., 2016]. They propose using differentially private stochas-
tic gradient descent (DP-SGD) to train deep learning models
in a private manner. This approach achieves high accuracy
maintaining relatively low DP bounds and being simpler to
implement, but may also require pre-training on public data.
Due to the fact that the DP threat model is extremely
broad, achieving a reasonable guarantee may be difficult
or even impossible. For this reason, a number of alter-
native definitions has been proposed over the recent years,
aimed at relaxing the guarantee or providing tighter composi-
tion bounds under certain assumptions. Examples are com-
putational DP [Mironov et al., 2009], mutual-information
privacy [Mir, 2012; Wang et al., 2016], different versions
of concentrated DP (CDP [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016],
zCDP [Bun and Steinke, 2016], tCDP [Bun et al., 2018]),
and Re´nyiDP (RDP) [Mironov, 2017]. Some other relax-
ations [Abowd et al., 2013; Schneider and Abowd, 2015;
Charest and Hou, 2017] tip the balance even further in favour
of applicability at the cost of weaker guarantees, for example
considering the average-case instead of the worst-case [Tri-
astcyn and Faltings, 2019b].
In this work, we rely on another relaxation, called Bayesian
differential privacy [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a]. This no-
tion utilises the fact that data come from a particular distribu-
tion, and not all data samples are equally likely (e.g. unlikely
to find a sound record among ECG samples). At the same
time, it maintains a similar probabilistic interpretation of its
parameters ε and δ. It is worth noting, that unlike some of the
relaxations mentioned above, Bayesian DP can provide a tail
bound on privacy loss, similarly to the moments accountant
(MA) [Abadi et al., 2016], and is not limited to a particular
dataset, but rather a particular type of data (e.g. emails, MRI
images, etc.), which is a much more permitting assumption.
Up until recently, another aspect of privacy in machine
learning has been largely overlooked: the human involve-
ment in the development cycle and manual data processing.
These issues can be mitigated, at least partially, by federated
learning (FL) [McMahan et al., 2016], which brings a great
promise for user privacy. Yet, FL paradigm creates additional
problems of its own. Augenstein et al. [2019] provide a good
starting point, systematising these problems and proposing
a solution by the use of synthetic data. Although privacy-
preserving data synthesis using GANs has been introduced in
earlier works [Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018;
Zhang et al., 2018; Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019b; Jordon et
al., 2018; Long et al., 2019], these papers mainly focused on
achieving high utility of synthetic data without addressing a
broader scope of privacy leakage via manual data handling.
A common problem of privacy-preserving GANs, how-
ever, is that the generated samples have very low fidelity,
unless the privacy guarantee is unreasonably weak. Our ap-
proach makes progress in exactly this perspective: we can
achieve much higher quality outputs with little compromise
in privacy guarantees (and only for outliers that are difficult
to hide). As a result, our synthetic data yield better perfor-
mance of downstream analytics, and simultaneously, provide
more powerful data inspection capabilities.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some background useful for un-
derstanding the paper.
We use D,D′ to represent neighbouring (adjacent)
datasets. If not specified, it is assumed that these datasets dif-
fer in a single example. Individual examples in a dataset are
denoted by x or xi, while the example by which two datasets
differ—by x′. We assume D′ = D ∪ {x′}, whenever possi-
ble to do so without loss of generality. The private learning
outcomes (i.e. noised gradients) are denoted by w.
Definition 1. A randomised function (mechanism) A : D →
R with domainD and rangeR satisfies (ε, δ)-differential pri-
vacy if for any two adjacent inputs D,D′ ∈ D and for any
set of outcomes S ⊂ R the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δ. (1)
Definition 2. Privacy loss of a randomised mechanism A :
D → R for inputs D,D′ ∈ D and outcome w ∈ R takes the
following form:
L(w,D,D′) = log
Pr [A(D) = w]
Pr [A(D′) = w] . (2)
Definition 3. The Gaussian noise mechanism achieving
(ε, δ)-DP, for a function f : D → Rm, is defined as
A(D) = f(D) +N (0, Iσ2), (3)
where σ > C
√
2 log 1.25δ /ε and C is the L2-sensitivity of f .
For more details on differential privacy, the Gaussian
mechanism, and how to use it in machine learning, we refer
the reader to [Dwork et al., 2014; Abadi et al., 2016].
Definition 4. A randomised function (algorithm) A : D →
R with domain D and range R satisfies (εµ, δµ)-(weak)
Bayesian differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets
D,D′ ∈ D, differing in a single data point x′ ∼ µ(x), and
for any set of outcomes S ⊂ R the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεµ Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δµ. (4)
While the definition of BDP is very close to that of DP,
there are some important differences: the interpretation of δ
is slightly different, data are assumed to come from a distri-
bution µ(x) (although it is not required to be known), and
samples are assumed to be exchangeable [Aldous, 1985].
Nonetheless, this notion remains applicable in a wide range
of practical scenarios [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a].
In parts of the paper, we refer to Augenstein et al. classifi-
cation of ML developer tasks, which can be condensed to:
T1 - Sanity checking data.
T2 - Debugging mistakes.
T3 - Debugging unknown labels / classes.
T4 - Debugging poor performance on certain classes /
slices / users.
T5 - Human labelling of examples.
T6 - Detecting bias in the training data.
4 Our Approach
In this section, we describe our approach, intuition behind it,
its privacy analysis, and discuss how to extend it to federated
learning settings.
4.1 Intuition
The primary distinction of Bayesian differential privacy is
that it takes into account the data distribution, and by exten-
sion, assumes that all data points are drawn from the same
distribution, although these distributions may be multimodal,
highly complex, and generally unknown. This is a natural
hypothesis in many machine learning applications, but espe-
cially so when working with generative models like GANs.
The task of generative modelling in itself is to learn an un-
derlying data distribution, and thus, a common distribution is
an implicit belief. This results in an organic match with BDP,
because there are no assumptions to add to the problem.
Another part of our intuition is that the foremost source of
privacy leakage are outliers. On the one hand, their respective
privacy loss would be discounted in BDP accounting due to
their low probability. On the other hand, we can reduce the
number of samples generated by the GAN to decrease the
chances of these outliers appearing in the synthetic dataset.
4.2 Overview
We are given a dataset D of labelled ({(xi, yi) | (xi, yi) ∼
µ(x, y), i = 1..n}) or unlabelled ({xi | xi ∼ µ(x), i =
1..n}) examples. This dataset can be decentralised, in which
case we would use FL (see Section 4.4). Our task is to train
a GAN, which consists of the generator G and the critic C
(discriminator), to generate synthetic samples from µ.
Our privacy mechanism follows the previous work on
privacy-preserving GANs [Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017; Xie
et al., 2018]. More specifically, it applies the Gaussian mech-
anism (clip to norm C and add Gaussian noise with vari-
ance C2σ2) to discriminator updates at each step of the train-
ing. Privacy of the generator is then guaranteed by the post-
processing property of BDP. It is worth mentioning, however,
that clipping and/or adding noise to generator gradients can
be beneficial for training in some cases, to keep a better bal-
ance in the game between the critic and the generator, and it
should not be overlooked by developers.
We choose not to implement more complicated schemes,
such as PATE-GAN [Jordon et al., 2018] or G-PATE [Long
et al., 2019], which use PATE framework [Papernot et al.,
2018] to guarantee differential privacy for GANs. Our key
rationale is that a more complicated structure of this solu-
tion could create unnecessary errors and additional privacy
leakage (e.g. leaking privacy by backpropagating through the
teachers’ votes to the generator, thereby neglecting the added
noise). Nevertheless, we show in our evaluation that due to
the distribution-calibrated BDP accounting (and hence, less
added noise) our GAN generates better quality samples com-
pared to these more complex solutions.
4.3 Privacy Analysis
In order to compute privacy guarantees of the synthetic
dataset w.r.t. the real one, we need to bound privacy loss of
the generative model. As noted before, we effectively enforce
privacy on the critic and then rely on preservation of guaran-
tees under post-processing. This arrangement ensures a sim-
ple adoption of privacy accounting for discriminative models.
Privacy accounting is done by using the Bayesian accoun-
tant [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a]. To benefit from the data
distribution information, it needs to sample a number of gra-
dients at each iteration in addition to the one used in the up-
date. These gradients are then used to estimate the upper con-
fidence bound on the privacy cost ct(λ):
ct(λ) = max{cLt (λ), cRt (λ)}, (5)
where
cLt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ+1,q)
[
e
k2−k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
, (6)
cRt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ,q)
[
e
k2+k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
. (7)
Here, B(λ, q) is the binomial distribution with λ experiments
(a hyper-parameter) and the probability of success q (equal to
the probability of sampling a single data point in a batch), gt
and g′t are two gradient samples differing in one data point.
The privacy guarantee is calculated from the privacy cost,
by fixing either εµ or δµ:
log δµ ≤
T∑
t=1
ct(λ)− λεµ. (8)
For more details on the Bayesian accountant and related
proofs, see [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a].
(a) Real. (b) Synthetic.
Figure 1: Real and synthetic samples on Fashion-MNIST.
An important difference in privacy accounting for GANs
is that not every update of the critic should be accounted for.
Updates on fake data samples do not leak information about
the real data beyond what is already accounted for in the pre-
vious iterations. Therefore, only real updates are sampled and
used for the privacy cost estimation. In some GAN architec-
tures, however, one should be careful to consider additional
sources of privacy leakage, such as the gradient penalty in
WGAN-GP [Gulrajani et al., 2017].
To better understand how the BDP bound relates to the tra-
ditional DP, consider the following conditional probability:
∆(ε, x′) = Pr [L(w,D,D′) > ε | D,D′ = D ∪ {x′}] . (9)
The moments accountant outputs δ that upper-bounds
∆(ε, x′) for all x′. It is not true in general for other account-
ing methods, but let us focus on MA, as it is by far the most
popular. Consequently, the moments accountant bound is
max
x
∆(ε, x) ≤ δ, (10)
where ε is a chosen constant. At the same time, BDP bounds
the probability that is not conditioned on x′, but we can trans-
form one to another through marginalisation and obtain:
Ex [∆(ε, x)] ≤ δµ. (11)
On the surface, this guarantee seems considerably weaker, as
it holds only in expectation. However, since ∆(·) is a non-
negative random variable in x, we can apply Markov’s in-
equality and obtain a tail bound on it using δµ. We can there-
fore find a pair (ε, δ)p that holds for any percentile p of the
data/user distribution, not just in expectation. In all our ex-
periments, we consider bounds well above 99th percentile, so
it is very unlikely to encounter data for which the equivalent
DP guarantee doesn’t hold.
4.4 Federated Learning Case
In the above description, we did not make any assumptions on
where the data are located. The most logical scenario to con-
sider is federated learning, like in [Augenstein et al., 2019],
such that the data remain on user devices at all times.
To accommodate FL scenarios, minimal modifications to
the approach are required. Training of the generative model
would be performed in the same way as any other federated
(a) Trained on correct
images with BDP.
(b) Trained on altered
images with BDP.
(c) Trained on altered
images with DP.
Figure 2: GAN output for detecting unwanted rotations on MNIST.
model, and privacy accounting would be done at the user-
level [Augenstein et al., 2019]. Baysian DP results are also
directly transferable to FL [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019c],
and privacy bounds are generally even tighter in this case.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the experimental setup, imple-
mentation, and evaluate our method on MNIST [LeCun et
al., 1998] and Fashion-MNIST [Xiao et al., 2017] datasets.
5.1 Experimental Setting
We evaluate two major applications of the technique. First, in
Section 5.2, we show that the generated samples can be used
for debugging ML model through data inspection, resembling
tasks T1-T4 from [Augenstein et al., 2019]. Second, we ex-
amine the quality of the downstream ML model trained di-
rectly on synthetic samples (Section 5.3), thus demonstrating
a possibility of solving T5 (data labelling/annotation) as well.
In the debugging experiment, we attempt to detect a more
subtle bug compared to [Augenstein et al., 2019]: an in-
correct image rotation that yields lower model performance.
While the pixel intensity inversion can be easily spotted using
low-fidelity synthetic samples, image rotation requires higher
fidelity to be detected.
Downstream learning experiments are set up as follows:
1. Train the generative model (teacher) on the original data
under privacy guarantees.
2. Generate an artificial dataset by the obtained model and
use it to train ML models (students).
3. Evaluate students on the held-out real test set.
We use two image datasets, MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
Both have 60000 training and 10000 test examples, where
each example is a 28 × 28 size greyscale image. The task of
MNIST is handwritten digit recognition, while for Fashion-
MNIST it is clothes type recognition. Although these datasets
may not be of particular interest from the privacy viewpoint,
this choice is defined by the ability to compare to prior work.
Our evaluation is implemented in Python and Pytorch3.
For the generative model, we experimented with variations
of Wasserstein GAN [Arjovsky et al., 2017] and WGAN-
GP [Gulrajani et al., 2017], but found the former to produce
better results, probably because gradient clipping is already a
3http://pytorch.org
Table 1: Accuracy of models: (1) non-private baseline (convolutional network); (2) private classifier (convolutional network trained with
BDP); and student models: (3) for G-PATE with (1, 10−5)-DP guarantee; (4) for WGAN with (1, 10−10)-BDP guarantee (our method).
Dataset Non-private Private classifier G-PATE Our approach
MNIST 99.20% 95.59% 56.31% 94.19%
Fashion-MNIST 91.51% 80.11% 51.74% 73.36%
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Figure 3: MNIST accuracy as a function of labelled images.
part of the privacy mechanism. Our critic consists of three
convolutional layers with SELU activations [Klambauer et
al., 2017] followed by a fully connected linear layer with an-
other SELU and then a linear classifier. The generator starts
with a fully connected linear layer that transforms noise (and
possibly labels) into a 4096-dimensional feature vector which
is then passed through a SELU activation and three decon-
volution layers with SELU activations. The output of the
third deconvolution layer is down-sampled by max pooling
and normalised with a tanh activation function.
Although we use centralised setting throughout this sec-
tion, the results are readily transferable to federated scenarios.
Previous work suggests that neither GAN sample quality [Tri-
astcyn and Faltings, 2019b] nor BDP guarantees [Triastcyn
and Faltings, 2019c] should be significantly affected.
5.2 Data Inspection
The data inspection experiment is setup in the following way.
We introduce the rotation bug through randomly rotating
some images by 90◦. We then train the two generative mod-
els, on correct images and on altered images, and compare
their samples. We also train a model with DP to show that its
image quality would not be sufficient to detect the error.
Figure 2 shows the output of generative models trained on
MNIST with and without image rotation. By examining the
samples, developers can clearly determine that a portion of
images was rotated. This way, the error can be promptly iden-
tified and fixed. On the other hand, with generative models
that uphold the traditional DP guarantee (Figure 2c), it would
be difficult to detect such pre-processing error, because the
produced samples have very low fidelity, even though ε in
this case is unjustifiably high at the order of 107.
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Figure 4: Fashion-MNIST accuracy as a function of labelled images.
We also observe that the synthetic data quality under BDP
(see Figures 1 and 2a) is sufficient to detect previously unseen
classes or dataset biases, such as under-represented classes.
Moreover, these results are achieved with a strong privacy
guarantee: under (1, 10−10)-BDP, and hence, the probability
that (1, 10−5)-DP does not hold for this data is less than 10−5.
5.3 Learning Performance
Here, we evaluate the generalisation ability of the student
model trained on artificial data. More specifically, we train
a student model on generated data and report test classifica-
tion accuracy on a real held-out set.
The goal of this experiment is to show that having a
privacy-preserving generative model we can use synthetic
samples to fully replace the real data. Not only it allows to
eliminate manual labelling of real (and potentially sensitive)
data, but also expand the set of problems that can be solved
by FL (task T5 in Augenstein et al. classification). For ex-
ample, some medical data cannot be automatically annotated,
and users are not qualified to do that, so high-quality synthetic
data would allow the annotation to be performed by doctors
without privacy risks for users.
We imitate human annotation by training a separate classi-
fier (with the same privacy guarantee as the generative model)
and using it to label synthetic images. While this approach
is somewhat different from prior work on generating data for
training ML models, comparisons in this section are still valid
because our annotator maintains the same privacy guarantee.
We choose to compare with the method called G-
PATE [Long et al., 2019], because it is one of the best recent
techniques in terms of privacy-utility trade-off. The authors
showed that it outperforms another PATE-based approach,
PATE-GAN [Jordon et al., 2018], as well as DP-GAN [Xie
et al., 2018], based on DP-SGD.
Student model accuracy is shown in Table 1. Apart from
G-PATE, we compare our method to a non-private classi-
fier trained directly on the real dataset, and a private clas-
sifier, trained on the real dataset with Bayesian DP. In the
case of generative models, the same (non-private) classifier is
trained on the private synthetic output. All results in the table
are obtained with the privacy guarantee of (1, 10−5)-DP, or
(1, 10−10)-BDP, which is equivalent to (1, 10−5)-DP for this
data with high probability. Although [Long et al., 2019] re-
port better results for (10, 10−5)-DP, we do not include those
in the study, because ε = 10 is too high for providing mean-
ingful guarantee [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2019a].
Generally, we observe that on these datasets switching
from real to synthetic data does not significantly deteriorate
accuracy of the student model while maintaining strong the-
oretical privacy guarantees. On MNIST, the drop in perfor-
mance between a private discriminative and a private gen-
erative approach is less than 1.5%. It is more noticeable
on Fashion-MNIST, but is still below 10% and is still lower
than the drop between a non-private and a private classifiers.
Moreover, as Figures 3 and 4 show, models trained on syn-
thetic data achieve sufficiently good performance even when
only a small portion of it is labelled. As little as 100 labelled
samples is enough to outperform models trained on data gen-
erated with comparable DP guarantees.
Interestingly, non-private synthetic data (not shown in the
table) allow to reach only marginally better results, suggest-
ing that most of the accuracy loss comes from the genera-
tive model rather than privacy preservation. Figures 3 and 4
seem corroborate this finding, as synthetic data learning curve
quickly saturates.
6 Conclusions
We explore the use of generative adversarial networks to
tackle the problem of privacy-preserving data inspection and
annotation in machine learning. While the previous ap-
proaches to this problem involve generative models either
without any privacy guarantee or with differential privacy, we
opt for a different privacy notion – Bayesian differential pri-
vacy. By capturing the inherent properties of data and allow-
ing for non-uniform privacy loss throughout the dataset, it
enables higher-fidelity synthetic data while still maintaining
a privacy guarantee comparable to DP.
Our evaluation shows that privacy-preserving GANs with
BDP can be used to detect subtle bugs in data itself or pre-
processing pipelines, which could not be caught by DP GANs
due to low samples fidelity. Similarly, biases in the data and
previously unseen classes can be discovered.
In addition, the generated data can be directly annotated
and used for training in place of the real data. We demonstrate
that student models trained on our synthetic samples achieve
significantly higher accuracy compared to prior state-of-the-
art and exhibit only a mild drop in performance compared
to private classification with real data. Furthermore, this gap
is mainly determined by the quality of the generative model,
and hence, will get smaller with advances in that field.
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